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MAIN POINTS
•	 Viktor	Orban	took	power	in	Hungary	at	a	time	when	the	coun-
try	was	plunged	in	a	deep	political	and	economic	crisis.	He	in-
troduced	radical	changes	in	the	country	and	thus	challenged	
the	 previous	 economic	 and	political	 order.	 The	mechanisms	
of	 checks	 and	 balances	 were	 significantly	 hemmed	 in,	 and	
the	political	opposition’s	 role	was	marginalised.	This	caused	
a	great	deal	of	controversy	abroad,	and	Orban’s	rule	provoked	
a	discussion	on	the	limits	of	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law	in	
the	European	Union.	The	reforms,	however,	have	not	under-
mined	the	fundamental	features	of	the	parliamentary	system,	
in	 place	 in	Hungary	 since	 1989.	 The	new	basic	 law	 includes	
some	necessary	solutions,	such	as	constitutional	restrictions	
on	 public	 debt.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 changes	 were	 aimed	 pri-
marily	at	reinforcing	the	central	government	and	expanding	
Fidesz’s	dominance	on	the	Hungarian	political	scene.	
•	 Fidesz’s	key	achievements	after	four	years	of	rule	are	a	consol-
idation	of	public	finances	and	a	slight	reduction	in	public	debt,	
though	this	remains	the	highest	in	the	region.	It	has	been	un-
able	to	overcome	the	economic	stagnation	ongoing	since	2007.	
Frequent	 legislative	changes	have	added	to	 the	deterioration	
of	 the	 investment	 climate,	 although	 the	 policy	 of	 support-
ing	selected	economic	sectors	has	prevented	capital	flight.	In	
turn,	the	drop	in	market	confidence	caused	temporary	prob-
lems	with	 the	 service	 of	 the	national	 debt.	 The	 government	
has	taken	a	number	of	short-term	measures	aimed	at	improv-
ing	the	situation	faced	by	citizens,	but	no	clear	perspective	for	
improving	the	dynamics	of	economic	growth	can	be	seen	yet.	
•	 No	 fundamental	 change	of	direction	has	been	seen	 in	Euro-
pean	and	foreign	policy	and	Hungary	has	shown	little	activ-
ity	and	initiative	as	part	of	the	EU	and	NATO.	Relations	with	
the	 USA	 and	 most	 large	 EU	 member	 states	 have	 cooled	 as	
a	consequence	of	the	controversies	over	Hungarian	reforms.	
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Although	politicians	from	Fidesz	have	resorted	to	Eurosceptic	
rhetoric	at	home,	 in	practice	Budapest	has	 followed	the	EU’s	
mainstream.	The	Orban	administration	confirmed	its	obliga-
tions	as	part	of	NATO	but	it	further	cut	the	country’s	military	
expenses.	
•	 Orban	has	shown	an	inclination	to	treat	co-operation	within	
the	 Visegrad	 Group	 not	 as	 a	 format	which	 supplements	 the	
European	 integration	process	 and	which	 is	 a	 foundation	 for	
political	 coalitions	 inside	 the	European	Union,	but	rather	as	
a	 group	 to	 counterbalance	 the	 ‘dictate’	 of	 Brussels	 and	 the	
largest	EU	member	states.	Although	Hungary’s	approach	was	
not	backed	by	its	partners,	the	country	became	engaged	in	co-
operation	as	part	of	the	V4,	pointing	out	the	Socialists’	negli-
gence	 in	 this	area.	On	 the	other	hand,	Fidesz	has	conducted	
a	much	more	active	policy	concerning	Hungarian	minorities	
abroad,	 and	 has	 thus	 caused	 tension	 in	 relations	 with	 the	
countries	it	borders.	
•	 The	 strategy	of	 an	 ‘Eastern	opening’	 in	 foreign	policy	which	
was	announced	at	 the	beginning	of	Fidesz’s	rule	has	brought	
limited	effects	despite	the	significant	diplomatic	expenses	in-
curred.	Establishing	closer	economic	relations	with	China	was	
initially	given	a	high	priority,	but	Russia	gradually	became	the	
leading	 economic	 partner.	 Although	 Fidesz	 as	 an	 opposition	
party	had	severely	criticised	close	co-operation	with	Moscow	
in	energy	issues,	it	continued	the	political	left’s	policy	after	the	
election.	 Furthermore,	 Orban’s	 government	 decided	 to	 build	
a	 comprehensive	 solution	 to	 address	 the	most	 important	 is-
sues	for	the	Hungarian	energy	sector	on	the	basis	of	co-opera-
tion	with	Russia.	It	has	actively	supported	the	construction	of	
South	Stream,	and	towards	the	end	of	its	present	term	chose	to	
entrust	a	Russian	company	with	developing	the	Paks	nuclear	
power	plant,	the	largest	investment	in	Hungary	since	1989.	
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INTRODUCTION
In	2010,	the	right-wing	party	Fidesz	took	total	power	in	the	coun-
try.	 Together	 with	 its	 satellite	 party	 the	 Christian	 Democratic	
People’s	Party	(KDNP),	it	achieved	a	sweeping	victory	in	the	par-
liamentary	election	in	April	2010.	It	won	53%	of	the	votes,	thus	re-
ceiving	68%	of	the	seats	(i.e.	a	constitutional	majority)	in	parlia-
ment	as	part	of	the	mixed	electoral	system.	This	victory	came	after	
two	back-to-back	defeats	in	2002	and	2006,	and	the	party	leader,	
Viktor	Orban	returned	to	his	role	at	the	head	of	the	government	
(after	having	been	prime	minister	from	1998	to	2002).	Parliament	
elected	Fidesz’s	Pal	Schmitt	president	of	Hungary	in	June	2010.	In	
October	2010,	Fidesz	received	58%	of	votes	in	local	elections,	and	
its	candidates	for	mayors	won	in	22	out	of	the	23	largest	cities,	in-
cluding	Budapest.	
At	the	root	of	Fidesz’s	dominance	on	the	Hungarian	political	scene	
was	the	economic	and	political	crisis	which	began	in	2002-2010,	
when	the	political	left	was	governing	the	country.	During	its	first	
term,	 the	 coalition	government	 formed	by	Socialists	 and	Liber-
als	oversaw	a	rapid	increase	in	the	country’s	debt	and	a	crisis	in	
public	finances.	Furthermore,	Hungary	benefited	much	less	from	
the	economic	boom	following	 its	 accession	 to	 the	European	Un-
ion	than	the	other	new	member	states.	Following	the	election	in	
2006,	Prime	Minister	Ferenc	Gyurcsany	appealed	for	reforms	at	
a	closed	party	meeting	and	at	the	same	time	concluded	that	the	ac-
tions	taken	by	the	cabinet	thus	far	had	been	a	failure	and	that	the	
Socialists	had	been	able	 to	 retain	power	only	by	concealing	 the	
tough	financial	situation	and	lying	during	the	election	campaign.	
His	speech	was	leaked	to	the	press	a	few	months	later,	causing	the	
strongest	political	upheaval	in	Hungary	since	1989.	A	wave	of	an-
ti-governmental	demonstrations	swept	across	the	country.	There	
were	violent	clashes	between	demonstrators	and	the	police	in	Bu-
dapest,	where	hundreds	of	people	were	 injured.	The	Gyurcsany	
government	retained	power,	but	the	political	left	began	haemor-
rhaging	popularity.	
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Fidesz	 capitalised	 on	 the	 disrepute	 of	 the	 political	 left,	 and	 to-
gether	with	KDNP	presented	 itself	as	 the	only	 legitimate	repre-
sentative	of	Hungarians.	Once	the	recording	discrediting	Prime	
Minister	 Gyurcsany	 had	 been	 disclosed,	 each	 time	 he	 spoke	 in	
parliament,	 the	 Fidesz-KDNP	 faction	would	 leave	 the	 chamber.	
During	 the	 referendum	 in	 2008	 initiated	 by	 Fidesz,	which	was	
a	plebiscite	against	 the	 left-wing	government,	citizens	voted	for	
the	 cancellation	 of	 charges	 for	 higher	 education,	 doctor’s	 visits	
and	 stays	 in	 hospital,	 imposed	 by	 the	 Gyurcsany	 government.	
However,	Fidesz	did	not	make	efforts	to	shorten	the	Socialist	gov-
ernment’s	term,	hoping	that	they	would	become	even	less	popular	
over	time.	The	international	economic	crisis,	which	caused	a	mass	
outflow	of	foreign	capital	from	Hungary,	dealt	the	political	left	the	
final	blow.	The	country	found	itself	on	the	verge	on	bankruptcy	
and	plunged	into	a	deep	recession	(-6.8%	GDP	in	2009).	Mass	re-
dundancies	were	seen	in	many	companies.	It	was	only	possible	to	
stabilise	 the	financial	situation	due	to	a	 loan	granted	by	the	 In-
ternational	Monetary	Fund	and	reforms	conducted	 in	consulta-
tion	with	the	IMF	by	the	technocratic	government	led	by	Gordon	
Bajnai.	However,	budget	cuts	and	tax	raises	made	the	Hungarian	
Socialist	Party	(MSZP)	even	less	popular,	and	their	support	levels	
fell	to	19%	during	the	election	(as	compared	to	40%	in	2006).
Fidesz	 skilfully	 capitalised	 on	 growing	 frustration	 among	 the	
Hungarian	 public,	 who	 were	 tired	 of	 constant	 political	 scan-
dals	and	the	difficult	economic	situation1.	The	2010	election	also	
marked	 an	 end	 to	 the	 previously	 established	 set-up	 of	 political	
1	 In	the	survey	conducted	by	Pew	Research	Centre	in	2009,	94%	of	respond-
ents	 from	Hungary	 described	 the	 situation	 in	 their	 country	 as	 negative,	
while	 72%	of	 them	saw	 it	 as	being	worse	 than	 in	 the	 communist	 era.	 71%	
of	respondents	were	of	the	opinion	that	EU	membership	has	weakened	the	
Hungarian	 economy.	 Although	 support	 for	 democratic	 values	 was	 high,	
deep	disillusionment	with	the	state	of	Hungarian	democracy	became	evi-
dent,	since	77%	of	respondents	saw	it	as	negative.	For	more	information	see:	
‘Hungary	Dissatisfied	with	Democracy,	but	Not	Its	Ideals’,	http://www.pew-
global.org/2010/04/07/hungary-dissatisfied-with-democracy-but-not-its-
ideals/http://www.pewglobal.org/2010/04/07/hungary-dissatisfied-with-
democracy-but-not-its-ideals/	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
4/
20
14
9
parties	 in	 parliament,	 since	 two	 anti-establishment	 parties	 en-
tered	parliament:	the	xenophobic	and	nationalist	Jobbik	party	and	
LMP	(Politics	Can	Be	Different),	a	party	promoting	sustainable	de-
velopment	and	the	protection	of	the	natural	environment.	Fidesz,	
Jobbik	and	LMP	challenged,	albeit	each	to	a	different	extent,	the	
existing	order	and	some	elements	of	the	consensus	regarding	the	
free	market,	liberal	democracy	and	the	Euro-Atlantic	orientation	
present	since	the	political	transformation	of	the	country.	
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I. DOMESTIC POLICY
In	the	government’s	rhetoric,	the	condition	of	the	state	which	the	
“nation”	had	regain	was	that	of	higher	necessity	which	allowed	the	
country’s	leadership	to	introduce	serious	changes	and	search	for	
new	solutions.	Fidesz’s	electoral	manifesto	in	2010	did	not	provide	
for	any	serious	reconstruction	of	 the	state.	However,	Fidesz	de-
fined	its	sweeping	victory	as	a	“revolution	at	the	ballot	boxes”,	an	
expression	of	public	consent	to	the	political	system	being	changed	
and	at	the	same	time	as	a	vote	of	no	confidence	for	the	disgraced	
Liberal	and	Socialist	political	elites.	A	declaration	of	the	“national	
co-operation	system”	was	accepted	at	the	onset	of	the	new	parlia-
mentary	term	and	made	available	to	read	on	display	in	all	public	
administration	buildings.	It	marked	the	symbolic	opening	of	the	
new	era.	A	new	social	contract	was	announced	as	a	culmination	
of	the	struggle	for	liberty	which	commenced	in	1956.	As	a	result	
“after	 forty-six	 years	 of	 occupation	 and	dictatorship	 and	 a	 cha-
otic	 two	 decades	 of	 transformation,	Hungary	 regained	 its	 right	
and	capability	to	determine	itself	as	an	autonomous	state”2.	Par-
liament	declared	the	setting	up	of	a	new	political	and	economic	
system,	the	main	pillars	of	which	would	be	“work,	home,	family,	
health	and	order.”	Ethnic	Hungarians	living	beyond	the	country’s	
borders	were	also	included	in	the	political	community.	This	above	
all	concerned	the	Hungarian	minorities	from	the	countries	bor-
dering	on	Hungary,	living	in	the	territories	the	country	had	lost	in	
1920.	Parliament’s	first	decision	was	to	introduce	facilitations	for	
ethnic	Hungarians	seeking	Hungarian	citizenship.	
1. The constitutional reforms
With	its	two-thirds	majority,	Fidesz	was	able	to	carry	out	a	major	re-
construction	of	the	state.	A	new	constitution	and	electoral	law	were	
adopted,	and	most	institutions	were	reorganised.	Reforms	covered	
2	 ‘Legyen	béke,	szabadság	és	egyetértés’,	14	June	2010,	http://www.kormany.
hu/download/2/33/00000/Politikai_Nyilatkozat.pdf	
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such	areas	as	local	governments,	the	labour	code,	the	pension	sys-
tem,	 education,	 the	 health	 service	 and	 the	 secret	 services.	 From	
the	beginning	of	its	term	in	May	2010	until	December	2013,	parlia-
ment	adopted	as	many	as	840	acts	(as	compared	to	583	acts	adopted	
throughout	the	entire	previous	term).	However,	the	foundations	of	
the	Hungarian	political	 system,	established	during	 the	round	ta-
ble	talks	in	1989,	were	not	changed,	and	around	80%	of	the	regula-
tions	in	the	new	constitution	are	identical	to	those	from	the	pre-
vious	one.	The	parliamentary-cabinet	system	has	been	preserved	
and	the	prerogatives	of	the	parliament	and	government	have	been	
strengthened	insignificantly.	The	president,	as	before,	is	elected	by	
parliament	and	has	no	extensive	power,	although	the	new	constitu-
tion	has	vested	the	president	with	the	right	to	dissolve	parliament	
should	it	fail	to	adopt	a	budget	by	31	March	of	any	given	year.	The	
number	of	deputies	in	the	unicameral	parliament	has	been	reduced	
from	386	to	199.	The	electoral	system	has	been	slightly	simplified,	
but	the	majority-proportional	system	has	been	preserved.	
Centralist	 tendencies	 could	 be	 observed	 in	 the	 reforms	 carried	
out	by	the	Orban	government.	The	amendment	of	the	 local	gov-
ernment	 act	which	 took	 effect	 together	with	 the	 new	 constitu-
tion	on	1	January	2012	partly	reversed	the	decentralisation	of	the	
state	which	had	been	effected	in	1990.	For	example,	it	reinvested	
central	authorities	with	the	power	to	supervise	educational	insti-
tutions	and	hospitals;	 these	had	been	supervised	by	district	au-
thorities	(megye).	The	public-private	pension	system	in	operation	
from	1998	was	liquidated,	and	the	open	pension	fund’s	assets	were	
taken	over	by	the	Treasury.	
A	number	of	symbolic	and	 ideological	changes	have	been	 intro-
duced.	Under	the	new	constitution,	the	name	of	the	state	‘Repub-
lic	 of	 Hungary’	 (Magyar Köztársaság)	 was	 changed	 into	 simply	
‘Hungary’	(Magyarország).	This	was	intended	to	symbolise	a	clear	
break	with	 the	 legacy	of	 the	People’s	Republic	of	Hungary.	Reg-
ulations	establishing	 the	protection	of	human	 life	 from	concep-
tion	and	defining	the	family	as	a	relationship	between	a	man	and	
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a	woman	were	included	in	the	new	constitution.	However,	regula-
tions	allowing	legal	abortion	and	relations	between	two	partners	
of	 the	 same	 sex	were	 not	 repealed.	 The	 government	 party	was	
afraid	to	change	the	solutions	backed	by	a	significant	part	of	Hun-
garian	public3.	
2. Fidesz’s hegemony in the state administration 
The	reconstruction	of	the	state	administration	enabled	Fidesz	to	
conduct	a	major	staff	reshuffle.	Although	replacement	of	person-
nel	in	state	institutions	and	state-controlled	companies	was	noth-
ing	new	in	Hungary	–	the	political	left	had	carried	out	a	thorough	
purge	after	 its	victory	 in	2002	–	Fidesz	carried	 it	 out	on	a	 scale	
hitherto	unseen.	The	reasons	for	the	changes	included	the	need	
to	 call	 the	 incompetent	 left-wing	 government	 to	 account,	while	
the	act	that	facilitated	dismissing	public	administration	servants	
adopted	at	 the	beginning	of	 the	new	government’s	 term	proved	
to	 be	 a	 handy	 instrument.	When	 Schmitt	 took	 the	 presidency,	
almost	all	presidential	administration	employees	were	replaced,	
even	though	his	predecessor	had	been	nominated	by	Fidesz4.	Staff	
reshuffles	were	also	seen	among	regulatory	authorities	and	at	cul-
tural	and	academic	institutions.	
The	reorganisation	or	creation	of	new	institutions	made	it	possi-
ble	to	replace	almost	all	senior	officials,	in	many	cases	before	the	
end	of	 their	 tenures.	One	example	was	 the	president	of	 the	Su-
preme	Court,	who,	following	the	reorganisation	and	renaming	of	
this	institution	(known	as	Kúria	since	2012),	had	to	leave	his	office	
before	his	term	had	expired.	State	institutions	became	more	po-
liticised.	A	qualified	majority	is	required	when	electing	directors	
3	 ‘Hiába	védett	a	magzat,	nem	szigorodik	az	abortusz’,	Index,	11	March	2011,	
http://index.hu/belfold/2011/03/11/az_abortuszrol_torveny_valtozasa_
varhato
4	 ‘Sólyom	 szinte	minden	munkatársát	 kirúgták,	 Szabadné	maradhat’,	Nép-
szabadság,	3	August	2010,	http://nol.hu/belfold/solyom_szinte_minden_
munkatarsat_kirugtak_schmittek	
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of	 regulatory	 institutions,	 the	 president	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court,	
judges	of	the	Constitutional	Court	and	other	senior	state	officials	
and	 this	 previously	meant	 that	 the	 candidates	were	 selected	 as	
a	 consequence	 of	 a	 compromise	 between	 the	 government	party	
and	the	opposition.	
3. The weakening of independent institutions
The	2010	election	vested	Fidesz	with	unusually	strong	power,	ena-
bling	it	to	push	through	any	legal	act.	State	institutions	which	had	
counterweighted	the	legislative	and	the	executive	powers	as	part	
of	the	checks	and	balances	system	were	weakened.	This	above	all	
concerned	the	Constitutional	Court	(CC),	which	–	given	the	weak	
presidential	prerogatives	and	the	lack	of	an	upper	parliamentary	
house	–	had	played	an	especially	vital	role	in	the	Hungarian	po-
litical	system.	The	new	constitution	curbed	the	CC’s	power	to	pass	
verdicts	on	budget	 issues,	 and	vested	parliament	with	 the	right	
to	nominate	the	court’s	president	 (previously,	 the	court’s	 judges	
elected	one	of	their	number	to	be	the	presiding	 judge).	The	gov-
ernment	 camp	 has	 on	 many	 occasions	 actually	 challenged	 the	
ultimate	nature	of	 the	Constitutional	Court’s	decisions.	 In	some	
cases,	when	 the	court	 found	an	act	 to	be	 incompatible	with	 the	
constitution,	parliament	would	amend	the	constitution	and	adopt	
the	act	in	unchanged	form	or	raise	the	rank	of	its	regulations	to	
constitutional	level.	Fidesz	has	resorted	to	this	trick	a	few	times,	
both	when	the	old	constitution	was	in	force	and	since	the	new	one	
has	been	adopted.	The	most	widely	publicised	case	took	place	in	
March	2013,	when	parliament	–	amending	the	constitution	for	the	
fourth	time	–	adopted	a	package	of	several	amendments	in	cases	
which	had	been	questioned	by	the	Constitutional	Court.	Finally,	
Fidesz	cancelled	some	of	the	changes	under	pressure	from	the	Eu-
ropean	Union,	the	Council	of	Europe	and	the	USA5.	
5	 It	should	be	noted	that	some	essential	decisions	passed	by	the	Constitutional	
Court,	for	example	the	one	deeming	the	obligation	to	register	for	election	
unconstitutional,	have	been	respected	by	the	parliamentary	majority.	
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4. The consolidation of power and the ‘irreversibility’ 
of the changes
Even	if	Fidesz	loses	power,	it	will	continue	to	wield	significant	in-
fluence	on	the	situation	in	the	country	since	it	has	extended	the	
tenures	of	many	 senior	officials	 and	nominated	 loyal	 adherents	
to	such	positions.	One	example	is	the	issue	of	media	supervision.	
The	 head	 of	 the	 National	 Media	 and	 Intercommunications	 Au-
thority	(NMHH	–	established	in	2010)	and	members	of	the	Media	
Council	were	appointed	for	nine-year	terms.	Reforms	conducted	
by	Fidesz	may	also	prove	extremely	difficult	for	the	next	govern-
ments	 to	 revert.	 The	 Hungarian	 legislative	 system	 includes	 an	
extensive	catalogue	of	so-called	“cardinal	acts”	(sarkalatos törvé-
nyek),	adopted	by	a	qualified	two-thirds	majority	 in	parliament.	
This	procedure	applies	to	acts	concerning,	for	example:	electoral	
law	and	the	scope	of	powers	of	the	Constitutional	Court	and	other	
central	institutions.	The	new	constitution	has	extended	the	scope	
of	 issues	which	can	be	regulated	under	cardinal	acts,	 including	
family	policy,	the	pension	system	and	the	tax	system.	This	will	be	
a	serious	restriction	for	future	cabinets,	which	will	find	it	difficult	
to	 implement	 their	 political	manifestos	 should	 they	 fail	 to	win	
a	two-thirds	majority.	For	example,	an	extensive	compromise	in	
parliament	would	be	needed	to	cancel	the	flat-rate	income	tax	in-
troduced	by	Fidesz.	Furthermore,	the	powers	of	the	Budget	Coun-
cil,	whose	members	 are	 linked	 to	 Fidesz,	have	been	 reinforced;	
and	this	institution	may	play	a	major	political	role	in	the	future.	
If	the	council	vetoes	the	budget	act,	and	the	government	fails	to	
adopt	a	new	one,	the	president	will	be	able	to	dissolve	parliament	
and	schedule	a	new	election.	
5. The dominant position of Prime Minister Orban
Fidesz’s	rule	is	characterised	by	the	unusually	strong	position	of	
Prime	Minister	Orban.	He	is	the	undisputed	leader	of	the	party.	
Although	Fidesz	is	formed	by	a	great	variety	of	right-wing	circles,	
no	factions	have	been	formed	inside	the	party,	and	Orban	has	no	
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real	 competitors	 among	 Fidesz	 members.	 The	 individuals	 who	
used	to	play	an	essential	role	in	this	party	have	either	been	mar-
ginalised	(Zoltan	Pokorni	and	Tamas	Deutsch)	or	hold	senior	po-
sitions	in	the	state	administration	and	have	not	shown	independ-
ent	political	ambitions	(President	Janos	Ader	and	Parliamentary	
Speaker	Laszlo	Kover).	Fidesz	politicians	of	the	younger	genera-
tion	(in	their	thirties	and	forties)	are	predominant	among	Orban’s	
closest	aides.	Janos	Lazar,	the	head	of	the	Prime	Minister’s	Office,	
is	playing	the	leading	role	among	them.	Lazar	has	been	mentioned	
as	Orban’s	potential	successor.
In	the	first	two	years,	when	the	constitutional	reform	of	the	state	
was	being	 implemented,	Pal	Schmitt,	who	was	completely	 loyal	
to	 the	 party,	was	 the	 president	 of	Hungary.	He	 replaced	 Laszlo	
Solyom,	who	was	linked	to	the	political	right	and	was	a	deeply	re-
spected	politician.	Nevertheless,	Fidesz	chose	not	to	elect	Solyom	
for	the	second	term.	Schmitt	approved	of	all	legal	acts	submitted	
to	him	 for	 signing.	He	did	not	use	his	 right	 to	 send	an	act	back	
to	parliament	to	be	considered	again	or	direct	it	to	the	Constitu-
tional	Court	even	once.	When	Schmitt	stepped	down	in	April	2012	
as	 a	 consequence	 of	 a	 plagiarism	 scandal,	 deputies	 from	Fidesz	
elected	Janos	Ader,	who	had	served	as	a	Member	of	the	European	
Parliament.	 The	 new	 president	 has	 shown	 some	 independence,	
since	he	has	directed	a	few	acts	to	the	Constitutional	Court	in	the	
first	two	years	of	his	presidency,	but	he	has	generally	shared	the	
party	line	as	regards	the	most	important	issues.	
The	 centre	 of	 power	 led	 by	 the	 prime	minister	 has	 been	 rein-
forced.	The	previous	twelve	ministries	have	been	replaced	by	eight	
strengthened	ministries;	only	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	
the	Ministry	of	Defence	have	remained	in	unchanged	form.	The	
Prime	Minister’s	Office	has	been	granted	more	extensive	compe-
tences.	It	has	taken	over	issues	concerning	foreign	economic	co-
operation	and	the	policy	of	 ‘Eastern	opening’	from	the	Ministry	
of	Foreign	Affairs.	The	National	Development	Agency,	which	is	in	
charge	of	the	distribution	of	EU	funds,	fell	under	the	supervision	
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of	the	Prime	Minister’s	Office	in	August	2013,	and	the	office’s	head,	
Janos	Lazar,	was	put	in	charge	of	the	agency.	The	civilian	intelli-
gence	service	also	reports	to	the	Prime	Minister’s	Office.	
6. Fidesz’s business and media base
Fidesz	has	also	used	its	dominant	position	in	politics	to	reinforce	
its	business	and	media	base.	The	Hungarian	press	has	given	pub-
licity	 to	a	number	of	cases	of	discrimination	 in	favour	of	entre-
preneurs	 linked	 to	 the	party.	The	Kozgep	construction	holding,	
which	has	regularly	won	public	tenders	over	the	past	few	years,	
has	played	the	key	role.	The	holding	is	owned	by	Lajos	Simicska,	
who	was	Orban’s	roommate	as	a	student	and	served	as	financial	
director	at	Fidesz	in	the	1990s.	In	2013	alone,	Kozgep,	either	by	it-
self	or	as	part	of	a	consortium,	won	public	contracts	worth	at	least	
430	billion	forints	(almost	1.4	billion	euros)6,	covering	primarily	
infrastructural	projects.	Acts	regulating	the	sale	of	tobacco	prod-
ucts	and	land	trade	have	given	rise	to	strong	controversies.	Busi-
nessmen	linked	to	the	political	right	benefited	from	both	acts.	
Fidesz	has	also	gained	more	influence	in	the	mass	media,	although	
a	section	of	the	Hungarian	press	is	critical	of	the	government.	At	
the	beginning	of	its	tenure,	Fidesz	dissolved	the	previous	institu-
tions	in	charge	of	media	supervision	and	established	the	National	
Media	and	Intercommunications	Authority	and	the	Media	Coun-
cil.	Fidesz’s	nominees	were	appointed	for	long	terms	as	members	
of	 both	 of	 these	 institutions.	The	politicisation	 of	 these	 institu-
tions	and	regulations	of	the	new	media	act	have	been	sharply	crit-
icised	by	journalists	groups	at	home	and	abroad	and	also	by	the	
Hungarian	political	opposition.	They	also	attracted	the	attention	
of	a	great	part	of	the	EU’s	member	states,	since	the	government	
made	the	changes	shortly	before	Hungary	took	the	presidency	of	
6	 Estimated	data	taken	from	the	investigative	journalism	portal	Atlatszo.hu,	
http://atlatszo.blog.hu/2014/01/08/kozgepes_kozbeszerzesek_2013-ban_
tul_a_400_milliardon	
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the	Council	of	the	European	Union.	The	most	controversial	issues	
included	the	possibility	to	impose	high	penalties	on	the	media	and	
regulations	forcing	journalists	to	reveal	their	sources	of	informa-
tion	under	certain	circumstances.	Part	of	the	regulations	which	
could	violate	European	 law	were	 loosened	under	pressure	 from	
the	European	Commission,	but	the	basic	part	of	the	act	remained	
in	 force.	However,	no	 gross	 violations	 of	 the	 freedom	of	 speech	
have	been	witnessed	over	the	past	few	years	(one	exception	could	
be	 the	problems	which	 the	 left-leaning	Klubradio	has	had	with	
obtaining	a	licence).	In	turn,	massive	layoffs	were	carried	out	in	
the	public	media,	which	are	now	clearly	pro-governmental	–	as	
they	were	under	Socialist	rule.	
The	government	has	made	us	of	a	number	of	propaganda	meas-
ures	to	popularise	its	actions	and	achievements.	Advertising	ac-
tions	branded	as	‘government	information’	have	been	carried	out	
on	a	large	scale.	Public	funds	have	been	spent	on	full-page	adver-
tisements	 in	Hungary’s	 largest	 dailies,	 Internet	 advertisements	
on	 the	 key	 news	 portals	 and	 on	 posters	 and	 hoardings.	 When	
speculation	about	the	terms	on	which	the	International	Monetary	
Fund	would	grant	a	loan	to	Hungary	appeared	in	the	media	in	Oc-
tober	2012	 (unconfirmed	by	 the	 IMF),	 the	government	 launched	
a	campaign	under	the	slogan	“We	shall	not	succumb	to	the	IMF!”7.	
When	the	EU’s	excessive	deficit	procedure	was	discontinued	with	
regard	to	Hungary	in	June	2013,	the	government	took	out	adver-
tisements	in	the	press	to	announce	that	the	EU	“had	been	forced”	
to	 close	 the	procedure,	 and	 every	 citizen	 received	 a	 letter	 from	
Prime	Minister	Orban	with	information	about	this	fact8.	The	gov-
ernment	conducted	a	number	of	advertising	campaigns	under	the	
7	 The	following	advertisements	were	published	 in	seven	major	dailies	with	
national	coverage	on	9	October	2012:	“What	can	we	expect	 from	the	IMF?	
Respect	and	trust!	We	will	not	allow	Hungary	to	lose	independence”,	“No	to	
reduced	support	to	families!	We	shall	not	succumb	to	the	IMF!”,	“No	to	real	
estate	 tax!”.	 http://index.hu/belfold/2012/10/09/nem_engedunk_az_imf-
nek_-.hirdeti_a_kormany/	
8	 The	letter	from	Orban	was	published	on	the	fn24	portal	on	9	August	2013,	
http://fn.hir24.hu/Root/Shared/Pictures/2013/08/09/orban-levele.jpg	
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slogan	“Hungary	is	better-off”	(Magyarország jobban teljesít) in	the	
last	 year	 of	 its	 present	 term,	 giving	 information	 about	 the	 gov-
ernment’s	achievements	in	press	advertisements	and	on	posters	
throughout	the	country	whose	graphical	layout	closely	resembled	
that	used	in	Fidesz	party	materials.	Advertisements	of	this	kind	
have	also	been	broadcast	on	television	during	the	election	cam-
paign.	Fidesz	has	thus	in	fact	exceeded	the	limit	of	TV	spots	set	for	
each	political	party.	
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II. ECONOMIC POLICY
Fidesz	took	power	in	difficult	economic	times.	Hungary	had	fallen	
into	its	deepest	recession	of	the	previous	decade	just	one	year	ear-
lier	(its	GDP	fell	by	6.8%	in	2009).	However,	the	country	was	not	
in	a	catastrophic	financial	situation.	The	real	threat	of	the	state	
defaulting	on	its	debts	had	been	averted	by	a	 loan	worth	20	bil-
lion	 euros	 granted	 by	 the	 IMF	 and	 other	 financial	 institutions.	
An	agreement	with	 the	 IMF marked	 the	beginning	of	a	process	
aimed	at	improving	the	health	of	public	finances	through	reforms	
conducted	by	the	technocratic	cabinet	led	by	Gordon	Bajnai9.	Its	
policy,	closely	consulted	with	the	IMF,	was	strongly	criticised	by	
Fidesz,	which	was	making	promises	 to	 end	 the	 austerity	policy	
and	open	a	new	beginning	in	economic	policy	during	the	election	
campaign.	However,	in	practice	Fidesz’s	manifesto	cannot	be	de-
fined	as	a	coherent	economic	strategy.	In	the	initial	period,	it	in-
cluded	elements	aimed	at	stimulating	economic	growth	through	
tax	cuts	for	small	and	medium-sized	companies.	Then,	an	attempt	
to	consolidate	public	finances	was	made	in	the	next	years,	while	
cuts	in	social	expenditure	were	avoided.	The	most	important	re-
forms	carried	out	by	Fidesz	covered:	
a)	major	changes	in	the	country’s	fiscal	system,	including	the	in-
troduction	of	low	income	taxes	along	with	the	imposition	of	high	
taxes	on	banks,	telecommunication	firms,	the	energy	sector	and	
retail	chains,	followed	later	by	increasing	and	imposing	new	tax-
es,	while	the	situation	in	public	finances	remained	difficult;
b)	major	changes	in	the	pension	system	as	a	consequence	of	what	
de	facto	was	a	disassembly	of	the	public-private	pension	system	
and	takeover	of	the	savings	from	open	pension	funds	by	the	state-
controlled	pension	system;	
9	 For	example,	the	extension	of	the	retirement	age	(from	62	to	65	gradually	
between	2010	and	2022),	the	freezing	of	wages	for	two	years	and	the	liquida-
tion	of	the	so-called	“thirteenth	paycheck”	for	public	servants,	and	the	VAT	
rate	increase	(from	20	to	25%).
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c)	strong	state	control	of	the	economy,	examples	of	which	include	
building	a	national	energy	giant,	increasing	interference	with	en-
ergy	prices	and	undermining	the	role	of	the	independent	office	for	
regulating	the	energy	sector.	
It	was	assumed	 in	Fidesz’s	economic	strategy	that	 the	 income	
tax	 cuts	 for	 individuals	 and	 small	 and	medium-sized	 compa-
nies	would	 revive	 the	 stagnant	Hungarian	 economy.	 In	 turn,	
the	special	taxes	imposed	on	some	sectors	and	the	return	to	the	
state-controlled	pension	system	were	expected	to	significantly	
improve	 the	 country’s	 fiscal	 situation.	 However,	 the	 govern-
ment’s	plans	had	to	face	domestic	and	foreign	restrictions.	The	
government	 has	 been	 forced	 to	 significantly	 modify	 its	 eco-
nomic	policy	throughout	its	entire	tenure	due	to	the	financial	
markets’	reaction	to	the	Hungarian	reforms,	the	volatile	situa-
tion	on	foreign	markets,	the	disciplinary	measures	adopted	by	
the	EU	with	regard	to	Hungary’s	budget	policy	and	continuing	
stagnation.	
1. The fiscal policy
In	 the	first	year	of	 its	 rule,	Fidesz	cut	 the	 income	 tax	and	was	
simultaneously	 searching	 for	new	 sources	 of	 budget	 revenues.	
A	16%	flat-rate	personal	income	tax	was	introduced	in	2011,	re-
placing	the	previous	system	where	two	thresholds	(18%	and	36%)	
applied.	The	 16%	corporate	 income	 tax	 (CIT)	 rate	was	 replaced	
with	two	rates:	19%	and	the	reduced	10%	rate	for	firms	with	in-
comes	lower	than	500	million	forints	(around	1.6	million	euros).	
Lower	budget	 incomes	were	 to	be	 compensated	by	 crisis	 taxes	
imposed	on	banks,	insurance	companies,	energy	companies,	tel-
ecommunication	service	providers	and	retail	chains.	In	Febru-
ary	 2011,	 the	 state	 took	 over	 savings	 from	open	pension	 funds	
worth	roughly	10	billion	euros.	This	de	facto	meant	the	cancella-
tion	of	the	reform	which	had	introduced	the	public-private	pen-
sion	system	in	1998.	These	funds	have	been	used	to	service	the	
current	needs	of	the	state.	
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The	imposition	of	additional	 levies	on	the	sectors	where	foreign	
capital	was	predominant,	the	failure	to	make	budget	cuts,	and	the	
use	of	solutions	to	improve	public	finances	by	use	of	one-off	meas-
ures	provoked	a	negative	reaction	from	the	financial	markets.	In	
late	2011/early	2012,	the	key	rating	agencies	(Fitch,	Moody’s,	and	
Standard	&	Poor’s)	reduced	the	rating	for	Hungarian	bonds	to	the	
‘non-investment’	grade.	Contrary	to	government	forecasts,	which	
had	 predicted	 economic	 growth	 at	 a	 rate	 of	 3-5%	 in	 2011-201310,	
Hungary’s	 economy	 once	more	 entered	 recession	 (-1.7%	GDP)	 in	
2012.	In	addition	to	this,	the	financial	crisis	in	the	eurozone	wors-
ened.	Hungary	again	 started	 to	have	problems	with	 the	 service	
of	the	national	debt.	Furthermore,	the	European	Commission	ap-
plied	strict	rules	to	the	reduction	of	Hungary’s	deficit,	refusing	to	
recognise	the	single	boost	in	budget	income	as	a	durable	improve-
ment	of	the	financial	situation.	Hungary	was	the	first	EU	member	
state	which	the	European	Commission	applied	its	strictest	instru-
ment	to	as	part	of	the	excessive	deficit	procedure,	namely	the	sus-
pension	of	part	of	the	funds	from	the	Cohesion	Fund	(the	measure	
was	lifted	once	the	government	had	implemented	a	package	of	re-
forms).	
The	government	had	to	significantly	modify	its	economic	policy.	
First	of	all,	it	had	to	impose	new	taxes	and	cut	spending	to	a	lim-
ited	 extent.	 Between	 2011	 and	 2013,	 parliament	 adopted	 a	 total	
of	eleven	law	packages	aimed	at	stabilising	the	budget	situation.	
The	VAT	rate	was	lifted	from	25	to	27%	(being	the	highest	in	the	
EU).	A	financial	 transaction	 tax	 (FTT)	was	 introduced,	 initially	
at	0.1%	rate	to	be	increased	subsequently	to	0.3%	(the	Hungarian	
National	Bank	was	exempted	from	the	tax	under	pressure	from	
the	EU).	The	crisis	tax	imposed	on	telecommunication	firms	and	
retailer	chains	was	lifted	in	2013,	while	the	other	crisis	taxes	were	
retained.	The	bank	tax,	which	was	to	be	lifted	after	two	years,	has	
10	 NGM-prognózis:	Csökkenő	adóterhek	és	újraelosztás,	Origo,	2	October	2010,	
http://www.origo.hu/gazdasag/hirek/20101102-ngm-2011ben-3-szazale-
kos-2012ben-35-szazalekos-gazdasagi-novekedes.html	
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become	a	constant	element	of	 the	Hungarian	fiscal	 system.	The	
generous	welfare	spending	was	effected	by	 limited	budget	cuts.	
Unemployment	benefits	and	earlier	retirement	schemes	were	re-
stricted.	 Furthermore,	 expenses	 on	 higher	 education,	 subsidies	
for	 public	 transport	 and	 medicine,	 and	 expenses	 of	 individual	
ministries	were	reduced.	As	a	result,	the	government	managed	to	
durably	bring	down	the	deficit	to	below	3%,	and	the	Council	of	the	
European	Union	withdrew	the	excessive	deficit	procedure	(EDP)	
in	June	2013,	which	had	been	imposed	on	Hungary	since	its	acces-
sion	to	the	EU	in	2004.	
2. More state in the economy
There	has	been	an	intensification	in	tendencies	towards	state	con-
trol	in	the	economy	since	2010.	Despite	the	difficult	financial	situ-
ation,	the	state	has	bought	back	a	number	of	previously	privatised	
companies	from	private	owners.	The	most	spectacular	takeovers	
were	seen	in	the	energy	sector.	The	government	bought	back	a	21%	
stake	in	MOL	from	Russia’s	Surgutneftegas	for	a	price	of	1.88	bil-
lion	euros	(MOL	is	an	important	player	on	the	regional	oil	market	
and	the	Hungarian	gas	transmission	system	operator).	The	state-
owned	corporation	MVM	spent	870	million	euros	to	buy	compa-
nies	belonging	to	Germany’s	E.ON	which	had	a	dominant	position	
in	 the	storage	and	trade	of	gas.	 In	addition	to	 that,	a	number	of	
smaller	takeovers	were	conducted	on	the	energy	market	from	for-
eign	entities	(e.g.	from	RWE	and	ENI).	The	state’s	reinforced	po-
sition	in	the	energy	sector	was	intended	to	help	the	government	
increase	its	 influence	on	the	way	the	sector	was	developing	and	
on	the	prices	of	energy	carriers.	Prime	Minister	Orban	promised	
that	entities	selling	energy	would	act	as	non-profit	organisations	
in	the	future11.	Since	the	company	which	buys	natural	gas	 from	
Gazprom	 has	 been	 taken	 over	 from	 E.ON,	 the	 state-controlled	
11	 ‘Orbán:	Brüsszelben	kell	megvívni	a	rezsiharcot’,	Magyar Nemzet,	31	January	
2014,	 http://mno.hu/belfold/orban-brusszelben-kell-megvivni-a-rezsihar-
cot-1208377
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corporation	will	negotiate	the	new	long-term	contract	with	Rus-
sia	(the	present	one	expires	at	the	end	of	2015).	
The	state’s	position	in	the	financial	sector	has	also	increased.	The	
state-owned	Hungarian	Development	Bank	(MFB)	bought	Germa-
ny’s	DZ	Bank’s	shares	 in	Takarekbank,	which	 is	 formed	by	sav-
ings	co-operatives	and	which	was	later	recapitalised	by	the	state.	
In	a	situation	where	access	to	loans	had	become	more	difficult	due	
to	high	taxes	imposed	on	banks,	the	government	made	attempts	to	
make	it	easier	for	entrepreneurs	to	receive	loans	with	the	help	of	
state-controlled	banks	and	the	National	Bank	of	Hungary.	Given	
the	hard	financial	situation,	further	takeovers	have	been	impos-
sible,	but	this	process	is	set	to	be	continued	in	the	coming	years.	
As	Prime	Minister	Orban	has	declared,	at	least	half	of	Hungary’s	
banking	sector	should	be	controlled	by	Hungarian	capital	–	at	pre-
sent,	90%	of	this	sector	is	owned	by	foreign	capital12.	
The	Fidesz	government	has	adopted	a	selective	approach	towards	
the	presence	of	foreign	capital	 in	Hungary.	It	has	imposed	addi-
tional	levies	on	companies	operating	in	the	services	sector,	above	
all	on	the	energy,	financial,	telecommunication	and	trade	branch-
es,	while	foreign	companies	active	in	the	production	sector	have	
been	 treated	on	preferential	 terms.	The	government	has	 signed	
a	number	of	strategic	co-operation	agreements	with	corporations	
from	this	sector.	These	agreements	were	intended	to	strengthen	
the	 companies’	 sense	 of	 security	 while	 legal	 regulations	 were	
changing	frequently	and	to	encourage	them	to	invest	more.	The	
government	has	signed	strategic	co-operation	agreements	with	43	
companies	 (including	13	 from	the	automobile	sector).	The	Prime	
Minister	has	personally	signed	the	agreements	with	Audi,	Daim-
ler,	Coca-Cola	and	Suzuki	among	other	companies.
12	 ‘Overhaul	 of	 Hungarian	 banking	 sector	 kicks	 off	 -	 7	 facts	 about	 Orbán’s	
dream’,	Portfolio,	 11	December	2013,	http://www.portfolio.hu/en/economy/
overhaul_of_hungarian_banking_sector_kicks_off_7_facts_about_or-
bans_dream.27062.html
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
4/
20
14
24
The	government	has	adopted	a	number	of	solutions	aimed	at	tem-
porarily	improving	the	situation	of	its	citizens	with	the	stagnant	
economy.	 These	were	 predominantly	 solutions	which	 burdened	
the	private	sector.	In	2011,	borrowers	received	the	option	to	make	
a	 single	 repayment	 of	 mortgage	 loans	 in	 foreign	 currencies	 at	
a	 reduced	 exchange	 rate,	which	 has	 been	 beneficial	most	 of	 all	
for	 those	who	had	more	money.	The	government	has	also	made	
attempts	to	force	banks	to	stop	offering	loans	in	foreign	curren-
cies	and	to	convert	existing	loans	in	foreign	currencies	into	forint	
loans,	but	has	been	unable	to	achieve	that	by	the	end	of	this	term.	
Its	most	important	move,	which	has	affected	all	consumers,	was	
to	force	energy	companies	to	cut	prices	for	individual	clients13.	In	
2013,	electricity,	gas	and	central	heating	prices	dropped	20%,	and	
the	 energy	price	 reduction	has	become	 the	 leitmotiv	 in	Fidesz’s	
campaign	ahead	of	the	election	in	April	2014.
3. The results 
Maintaining	 financial	 discipline	 and	 reducing	 the	 level	 of	 the	
budget	deficit	to	below	3%	are	the	government’s	greatest	achieve-
ments.	The	 imposition	of	 a	 constitutional	 limit	 (50%	of	GDP)	on	
public	debt	was	also	a	positive	move	Fidesz	made.	If	the	debt	ex-
ceeds	 this	 level	–	as	 is	 currently	 the	case	–	 the	budget	act	must	
provide	for	reducing	it.	The	Orban	government	has	reduced	public	
debt	to	a	limited	extent,	but	it	remains	at	a	level	of	around	80%,	
the	highest	in	the	region.	The	country’s	high	foreign	debt	will	also	
continue	to	be	a	problem.	
The	government	has	been	unable	to	overcome	the	economic	stag-
nation	continuing	without	change	since	2007.	Furthermore,	Hun-
gary	entered	recession	for	the	second	time	recently	in	2012	(-1.7%).	
The	 low	 flat-rate	 tax	 contributed	 domestic	 demand	 receiving	
13	 For	more	information	see:	A.	Sadecki,	‘The	Hungarian	government’s	strug-
gle	against	foreign	energy	companies’,	27	March	2013,	http://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-03-27/hungarian-governments-struggle-
against-foreign-energy-companies	
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a	boost,	 but	 this	 has	 been	 sated	primarily	with	 imported	prod-
ucts.	 The	 imposition	 of	 additional	 levies	 on	 banks	 has	 signifi-
cantly	curbed	the	availability	of	loans	for	companies.	In	turn,	the	
imposition	of	crisis	taxes	on	some	sectors,	the	frequent	legislation	
changes	and	the	increased	state	interference	in	markets	have	all	
adversely	 affected	 the	 investment	 climate.	 Although	 no	 major	
outflow	of	investments	from	Hungary	has	been	seen,	the	oppor-
tunities	to	attract	new	investors	have	been	significantly	reduced.	
A	significant	 improvement	 in	 the	 level	of	employment	has	been	
impossible	over	the	past	four	years	(Fidesz’s	key	promise	as	part	
of	its	campaign	in	2010	was	to	create	one	million	jobs	within	a	dec-
ade).	Although	the	unemployment	rate	fell	from	11.2%	in	2010	to	
10.2%	in	2013,	few	new	jobs	were	created	within	this	period.	Un-
employment	was	reduced	primarily	owing	to	expanding	the	pub-
lic	work	programme,	which	extended	 to	almost	 300,000	people	
towards	 the	 end	 of	 201314.	 Emigration	 from	Hungary	mostly	 to	
Germany	has	increased	significantly	over	the	past	few	years.	The	
unemployment	 rate	 has	 still	 not	 been	 brought	 back	 to	 the	 pre-
crisis	level	of	7.4%	(2007).	The	very	low	employment	rate	remains	
a	weakness	of	the	Hungarian	economy.	The	rate	is	62.1%	for	people	
aged	20-64,	while	the	EU	average	is	68.4%15.
14	 ‘Közelít	a	300	ezerhez	a	közmunkások	száma’,	Világgazdaság,	18	November	
2013,	http://www.vg.hu/kozelet/kozelit-a-300-ezerhez-a-kozmunkasok-
szama-416015	
15	 Employment	 rate	 by	 sex,	 age	 group	 20-64,	 Eurostat,	 http://epp.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pco
de=t2020_10	
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Chart 1.	Economic	growth	(%	of	GDP)
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Chart 3.	Budget	deficit	(%	of	GDP)
-6.5
-7.9
-9.4
-5.1
-3.7
-4.6 -4.3
4.3*
-2.0 -2.4
-3.0
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
2004
[% of GDP]
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2011
2012 2013** 2014**
Source:	Eurostat
*	Budget	surplus	resulting	from	the	Treasury’s	takeover	of	the	savings	from	
private	pension	funds
**	European	Commission	forecast
Chart 4.	Public	debt	(%	of	GDP)
59.5 61.7
65.9 67.0
73.0
79.8 82.2 82.1 79.8 77.8 79.1
0
20
40
60
80
100
2004
[% of GDP]
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014*
Source:	Eurostat
*	European	Commission	forecast
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
4/
20
14
28
III. EUROPEAN AND FOREIGN POLICY
The	 government	 led	 by	 Orban	 has	 not	 made	 any	 fundamental	
changes	 in	 the	 country’s	European	and	 foreign	policy.	Over	 the	
past	four	years,	little	activity	and	initiative	has	been	seen	in	Hun-
gary’s	foreign	policy	as	part	of	the	EU	and	NATO.	Relations	with	
the	USA	and	most	large	EU	member	states	have	cooled	as	a	conse-
quence	of	controversies	over	Hungarian	reforms.	Although	politi-
cians	from	Fidesz	have	resorted	to	Eurosceptic	rhetoric	at	home,	
in	practice	Budapest	has	followed	the	EU’s	mainstream.	The	Or-
ban	administration	confirmed	its	obligations	as	part	of	NATO	but	
it	 further	cut	 the	country’s	military	expenses.	At	present,	mili-
tary	expenses	are	as	low	as	around 0.8%	of	GDP	(2014).	This	level	
of	expenses	allows	the	army	to	maintain	its	capabilities	but	pre-
vents	the	modernisation	of	outdated	military	equipment.	
The	 Fidesz	 government	 has	 demonstrated	 a	 greater	 interest	 in	
regional	 co-operation,	 especially	 as	part	of	 the	Visegrad	Group.	
However,	 its	 policy	 towards Hungarian	minorities	 in	 the	 coun-
tries	 it	borders	has	given	rise	 to	 tension	 in	relations	with	 these	
countries,	especially	Slovakia	and	Romania.	Due	to	the	economic	
crisis	in	the	West	and	increasing	political	tension	in	relations	with	
part	of	Hungary’s	traditional	partners,	Budapest	has	made	efforts	
to	intensify	political	and	economic	relations	with	Eastern	coun-
tries.	Closer	political	and	energy	contacts	have	been	established	
above	all	with	Russia	as	part	of	the	‘Eastern	opening’	policy.	
1. European policy
Neither	statements	from	government	representatives	nor	strate-
gic	documents	have	provided	a	coherent	vision	 for	 the	develop-
ment	of	the	European	Union.	The	foreign	policy	strategy	of	201116	
16	 Hungary’s	Foreign	Policy	after	the	Hungarian	Presidency	of	the	Council	of	
the	European	Union,	2011,	http://www.kormany.hu/download/e/cb/60000/
foreign_policy_20111219.pdf	
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expressed	support	for	enhancing	integration	and	the	primacy	of	
the	 community	method	 over	 the	 intergovernmental	method	 in	
the	EU’s	decision-making	process.	At	the	same	time,	the	need	to	
reinforce	the	position	of	democratically	elected	governments	has	
been	emphasised.	Some	discrepancies	have	also	been	heard	in	the	
views	voiced	by	 the	minister	of	 foreign	affairs,	 Janos	Martonyi,	
who	has	declared	support	for	closer	integration,	and	Prime	Min-
ister	Orban,	who	has	made	references	to	the	tradition	of	a	‘Europe	
of	the	nations’.	Orban	accepts	the	deepening	financial	integration	
of	 the	 eurozone	member	 states	 because	Hungary	wants	 its	 key	
economic	partners	to	remain	stable.	He	does,	however,	insist	that	
the	states	which	do	not	belong	to	the	eurozone	be	given	the	high-
est	degree	of	economic	sovereignty.	
In	practice,	Hungary	has	accepted	 the	main	directions	of	Euro-
pean	integration	over	the	past	four	years	(with	the	exception	of	
the	“Euro	Plus	Pact”).	It	has	not	blocked	any	decisions	in	the	EU	re-
quiring	unanimity	of	the	member	states.	When	Hungary	held	the	
presidency	of	the	Council	of	the	EU	in	the	first	half	of	2011,	it	con-
tributed	to	progress	 in	work	on	the	so-called	“six-pack”,	 i.e.	 the	
package	of	economic	governance	rules	in	the	EU.	Initially	Hunga-
ry,	like	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	Czech	Republic,	was	sceptical	
about	the	fiscal	pact	but,	unlike	these	two,	it	finally	supported	the	
pact.	Although	the	intention	to	introduce	the	euro	as	the	national	
currency	is	mentioned	in	official	documents,	actions	and	declara-
tions	 from	Fidesz	politicians	have	proven	that	 they	have	 in	 fact	
given	up	efforts	to	adopt	the	common	currency.	In	the	opinion	of	
Prime	Minister	Orban,	Hungary	should	not	consider	introducing	
the	euro	until	it	has	achieved	a	level	equivalent	to	90%	of	the	av-
erage	GDP	of	the	eurozone	member	states17.	The	new	constitution	
states	that	the	forint	is	the	Hungarian	currency,	which	makes	the	
introduction	of	the	euro	even	more	difficult.	This	means	that	an	
17	 ‘Orbán	megismételte	az	eurócsatlakozás	egyik	feltételét’,	Portfolio,	12	Octo-
ber	 2013,	 http://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/orban_megismetelte_az_eu-
rocsatlakozas_egyik_feltetelet.190419.html
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amendment	to	the	constitution	and	an	extensive	political	compro-
mise	will	be	needed	to	accept	the	euro	as	the	national	currency	in	
Hungary.	
Among	the	major	challenges	which	Hungary	has	faced	in	its	Euro-
pean	policy	over	the	past	four	years	are:	its	presidency	of	the	Coun-
cil	of	 the	EU	 in	 the	first	half	of	2011	and	negotiations	of	 the	EU’s	
multiannual	 financial	 framework	 for	 2014-2020.	 The	 Hungarian	
diplomacy	effectively	directed	the	work	of	 the	Council	of	 the	EU.	
A	significant	part	of	priorities	which	had	been	previously	set	were	
implemented,	 including	 the	 accession	 treaty	 with	 Croatia	 being	
signed	 and	 the	EU’s	 strategy	 for	 the	Danube	 region	 (EUSDR)	 be-
ing	adopted.	However,	the	controversial	media	act	adopted	by	the	
Hungarian	parliament	just	before	Hungary’s	presidency	and	Prime	
Minister	Orban’s	confrontational	statements	cast	a	shadow	on	the	
evaluation	of	the	Hungarian	presidency.	Achieving	a	good	result	in	
the	negotiations	concerning	the	new	financial	framework	became	
the	next	priority	 task	 for	Hungary.	Hungary	belonged	 to	 the	 so-
called	“friends	of	cohesion	policy	group”	and	to	the	coalition	of	the	
states	supporting	a	strong	common	agricultural	policy.	Although	
more	funds	have	been	granted	to	Hungary	as	compared	to	the	Eu-
ropean	Commission’s	initial	proposal	and	it	will	still	receive	more	
funds	from	the	EU	budget	than	it	pays	in,	it	will	receive	significant-
ly	less	money	than	in	2007-2013.	Hungary	will	receive	18.34	billion	
euros	from	the	Cohesion	Fund	in	the	next	seven	years,	i.e.	20%	less	
than	as	part	of	the	previous	financial	framework18.
2. The international criticism
Hungary’s	 relations	with	 its	Western	 partners	 have	 cooled	 sig-
nificantly.	Fidesz	has	been	criticised	for	 ‘abusing’	 its	 two-thirds	
majority	 in	 parliament	 and	 an	 excessive	 concentration	 of	 pow-
er.	 It	 has	 been	 accused	 for	 example	 of	 restricting	 the	 role	 of	
18	 ‘Többéves	pénzügyi	keret	–	versenyképesség	és	szolidaritás’,	http://eu.kor-
many.hu/tobbeves-penzugyi-keret-2014-2020	
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independent	 state	 institutions	 (especially	 the	 Constitutional	
Court	and	the	Hungarian	National	Bank)	and	of	attempts	to	con-
trol	the	media.	It	has	also	been	criticised	abroad	for	the	imposition	
of	additional	levies	on	the	sectors	of	the	economy	where	foreign	
capital	predominates.	
Accusations	 against	 the	Hungarian	government	have	been	made	
primarily	by	the	American	and	German	diplomacy	and	from	the	
president	of	the	European	Commission.	The	European	Parliament	
and	the	Council	of	Europe	adopted	resolutions	criticising	the	po-
litical	reforms,	determining	that	part	of	the	Hungarian	regulations	
were	contrary	to	the	European	legal	system.	The	resolutions	rec-
ommended	changes	but	did	not	resort	to	the	use	of	stricter	instru-
ments,	such	as	the	launch	of	the	procedure	to	suspend	the	member	
state’s	right	to	vote	in	the	Council	of	the	EU.	The	European	Union	
has	 taken	more	 lenient	measures	 than	were	available	 to	 it	when	
dealing	with	Hungary	partly	because	Fidesz	belongs	to	the	Europe-
an	People’s	Party	(EPP),	the	largest	faction	in	European	Parliament,	
though	Orban’s	policy	has	also	been	criticised	within	the	EPP.	Mod-
eration	 in	 evaluating	 the	Hungarian	government	 and	 support	 in	
view	of	disproportionately	strong	criticism	have	been	manifested	
especially	by	Hungary’s	partners	from	the	Visegrad	Group.	
Budapest	 has	 relinquished	 part	 of	 the	 planned	 changes	 or	 re-
pealed	the	most	controversial	regulations	under	foreign	pressure.	
As	a	rule,	 it	made	 limited	concessions	when	other	countries	 in-
sisted	on	 them.	Budapest	was	willing	 to	 cancel	especially	 those	
changes	 in	 the	 case	 of	which	 the	 European	 Commission	would	
launch	the	EU	infringement	procedure,	which	could	have	ended	
in	 sanctions	being	 imposed	by	 the	Court	 of	 Justice	of	 the	Euro-
pean	Union,	and	also	in	those	cases	where	Washington	or	Berlin	
insisted	especially	strongly.	Nevertheless,	most	of	 the	criticised	
changes	have	remained	in	force.	
The	controversies	over	Hungarian	reforms	and	the	government’s	
moves	 adversely	 affecting	 foreign	 business	 have	 undermined	
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Hungary’s	international	position	and	led	to	cooling	relations	with	
the	 states	 of	Western	 Europe	 and	 the	USA.	 These	 relations	 have	
been	restricted	to	multilateral	co-operation	as	part	of	the	EU	and	
NATO.	Western	politicians	have	bypassed	Budapest,	and	the	Hun-
garian	diplomacy	has	found	it	difficult	to	organise	the	sparse	visits	
by	the	Hungarian	prime	minister	and	president	to	Western	Euro-
pean	capitals	 (London	and	Berlin).	Hungary’s	relations	with	Ger-
many,	its	key	trade	partner	and	largest	investor,	have	been	tense.	
Berlin	has	reproached	the	Hungarian	government	for	violating	the	
standards	of	 the	European	 rule	of	 law	and	has	protested	against	
regulations	 unfavourable	 to	German	 companies	 present	 in	Hun-
gary.	Criticism	has	even	been	heard	from	southern	federal	states	of	
Germany,	despite	Hungary’s	engagement	 in	Danube	co-operation	
and	the	close	contacts	between	the	CSU	and	Fidesz.	Nevertheless,	
relations	 between	 Budapest	 and	 Berlin	 have	 remained	 relatively	
stable,	partly	as	a	consequence	of	major	efforts	made	by	Hungary.	
Tension	in	foreign	relations	did	not	harm	Fidesz’s	popularity	on	
the	domestic	scene.	On	the	contrary,	this	contributed	to	a	consoli-
dation	of	the	political	right’s	electorate.	The	government	present-
ed	the	reservations	regarding	the	Hungarian	reforms	as	unrea-
sonable	interference	in	Hungary’s	sovereign	decisions.	Politicians	
from	 Fidesz	 suggested	 that	 Western	 countries	 were	 criticising	
the	political	changes	in	Hungary	mainly	due	to	the	fact	that	the	
interests	of	Western	companies	had	been	affected	by	the	govern-
ment’s	moves	and	because	the	conservative	changes	were	unwel-
come	 to	 those	 holding	 liberal	 and	 leftist	 views.	 They	 presented	
the	government’s	actions	as	 the	next	stage	 in	 the	 long	“struggle	
for	freedom”,	making	references	for	example	to	the	Spring	of	Na-
tions	in	1948-49.	 In	turn,	Prime	Minister	Orban	claimed	during	
right-wing	rallies	that	Brussels	could	not	dictate	to	Hungary	what	
it	has	to	do,	like	Soviet	Moscow	or	Habsburg	Vienna	had	done19.	
19	 ‘1848	 és	 2010	 is	 megújulást	 hozott’,	 15	 March	 2011,	 http://www.korma-
ny.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-
interjuk/1848-es-2010-is-megujulast-hozott	
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Fidesz	politicians	found	it	easy	to	play	down	foreign	criticism	due	
to	 the	 tone	of	 the	attacks	 from	some	Western	media	and	politi-
cians,	who	aggressively	 attacked	 the	Hungarian	government	or	
who	presented	the	situation	in	Hungary	in	an	unreliable	manner.	
All	this	allowed	the	attention	to	be	distracted	from	specific	accu-
sations	from	the	European	Commission	and	critical	legal	opinion	
of	the	political	reforms,	for	example	those	presented	by	the	Venice	
Commission	(an	advisory	body	to	the	Council	of	Europe	on	consti-
tutional	issues).	
3. The policy on Central Europe
Given	the	sharp	disputes	with	European	institutions,	the	Hungar-
ian	 government	 has	 shown	 an	 inclination	 to	 treat	 co-operation	
within	the	Visegrad	Group	not	as	a	format	which	supplements	the	
European	integration	process	and	which	is	a	foundation	for	politi-
cal	coalitions	inside	the	European	Union,	but	rather	as	a	group	to	
counterbalance	the	‘dictate’	of	Brussels	and	the	largest	EU	mem-
ber	 states.	Although	Hungary’s	 approach	was	not	 backed	by	 its	
partners,	the	country	became	engaged	in	co-operation	as	part	of	
the	V4,	 pointing	 out	 the	 Socialists’	 negligence	 in	 this	 area.	 The	
Visegrad	Group	has	proven	to	be	a	valuable	co-operation	format	
for	Hungary	as	its	relations	with	other	EU	member	states	and	the	
European	Commission	have	deteriorated.	
Central	European	co-operation	is	a	traditional	component	of	the	
approach	to	foreign	policy	represented	by	part	of	Fidesz’s	conserv-
ative	elite.	The	Visegrad	Group	has	been	the	basic	platform	of	co-
operation	 for	Hungary,	 although	Hungarians	have	also	 fostered	
collaboration	as	part	of	other	formats,	above	all	the	EU’s	strategy	
for	the	Danube	region.	Budapest	has	attached	significance	to	de-
veloping	energy	and	road	 infrastructure	connections	as	part	of	
the	V4.	Hungary	has	been	above	all	promoting	engagement	in	the	
Western	Balkan	 region	 in	 the	 area	 of	EU	neighbourhood	policy	
which	is	vital	for	the	‘Visegrad	four’,	although	it	has	also	backed	
actions	with	regard	to	the	area	covered	by	Eastern	Partnership.	
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Hungary	holding	the	presidency	of	the	Visegrad	Group	(July	2013	
–	June	2014)	has	declared	it	is	willing	to	continue	the	actions	initi-
ated	under	the	Polish	presidency,	since	Poland	is	viewed	as	Hun-
gary’s	strategic	partner	in	the	region.	
The	issue	of	national	minorities	living	in	the	countries	bordering	
Hungary,	a	total	of	approximately	2.2	million	people,	has	played	
a	significantly	more	 important	role	 in	 foreign	policy	 than	 it	did	
under	 Socialist	 rule.	 The	 level	 of	 financial	 support	 for	 the	mi-
norities	has	been	slightly	increased.	Furthermore,	Budapest	has	
become	more	engaged	in	the	political	 life	of	Hungarian	commu-
nities.	 The	 Orban	 government	 has	 offered	 selective	 support	 to	
Hungarian	parties	in	the	neighbouring	countries,	backing	those	
which	 insist	more	 strongly	 on	 being	 given	 autonomy,	 standing	
firmly	on	 the	 ground	of	 collective	minority	 rights.	A	 simplified	
procedure	for	granting	Hungarian	citizenship	was	adopted.	More	
than	half	a	million	ethnic	Hungarians	made	use	of	this	procedure	
between	2011	and	2013.	The	new	electoral	law	granted	active	suf-
frage	(albeit	not	to	a	full	extent)	to	Hungarian	citizens	who	have	
not	registered	residence	in	Hungary20.	The	constitutional	provi-
sions	have	also	been	reinforced,	stating	firmly	that	the	Hungar-
ian	state	“bears	responsibility”	for	the	fate	of	ethnic	Hungarians	
living	abroad21.	
The	policy	towards	Hungarian	minorities	would	at	times	give	rise	
to	tension	in	relations	with	the	countries	they	are	citizens	of.	At	
the	 beginning	 of	 its	 present	 term,	 parliament	 established	 ‘Na-
tional	Unity	Day’	commemorating	the	anniversary	of	the	signing	
the	Treaty	of	Trianon	on	4	June	1920,	as	a	consequence	of	which	
20	 As	part	of	 the	proportional-majority	voting	system,	Hungarian	citizens	who	
have	no	registered	place	of	residence	in	Hungary	are	only	eligible	to	vote	for	
party	lists,	and	not	for	individual	candidates	in	single-member	constituencies.	
21	 For	more	 information	 see:	M.	 Gniazdowski,	 A.	 Sadecki,	 ‘Constitution	 for	
a	new	Hungary	–	the	domestic	and	regional	implications’,	OSW Commentary, 
No.	60	of	29	July	2011,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commen-
tary_60.pdf
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Hungary	lost	lands	which	were	then	inhabited	by	over	3	million	
of	its	compatriots.	Although	the	memory	of	Trianon	had	formed	
a	constant	element	of	the	identity	of	the	Hungarian	political	right,	
the	Orban	government	has	turned	it	into	an	element	of	the	state’s	
ideology.	This	has	been	criticised	especially	strongly	by	Slovakia.	
The	Hungarian	minority	issue	(460,000	people,	8.5%	of	the	popu-
lation)	became	a	key	topic	of	the	election	campaign	in	Slovakia	in	
2010.	The	Slovakian	government,	whose	term	was	coming	to	an	
end,	responded	to	the	facilitated	granting	of	Hungarian	citizen-
ship	by	passing	regulations	under	which	a	person	seeking	anoth-
er	country’s	citizenship	could	have	their	Slovakian	citizenship	re-
voked.	The	atmosphere	of	Hungarian-Slovak	relations	improved	
significantly	over	the	following	years,	even	though	the	dispute	at	
issue	had	not	been	resolved,	and	more	pressure	was	put	on	col-
laboration	in	the	area	of	energy	and	transport	infrastructure	and	
developing	Visegrad	co-operation	and	the	community	of	interests	
in	the	EU.	
Co-operation	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 and	 the	 Visegrad	 Group,	
including	as	part	of	the	 ‘V4+’	format,	where	others	of	Hungary’s	
neighbours	participated,	allowed	the	controversies	caused	by	Bu-
dapest’s	engagement	in	the	political	life	of	Hungarian	communi-
ties	 in	 the	 neighbouring	 countries	 to	 be	 soothed.	Nevertheless,	
relations	with	Romania,	where	the	Hungarian	community	is	the	
most	numerous	 (1.23	million,	6.5%	of	Romania’s	population),	be-
came	cooler	in	the	second	half	of	Orban’s	term.	When	Fidesz	took	
power,	 a	 rapprochement	 between	 Hungary	 and	 Romania	 took	
place,	and	was	additionally	cemented	by	good	relations	between	
Prime	Minister	Orban	and	President	Traian	Basescu.	Romania’s	
centre-right	government	was	able	 to	 sympathise	with	 the	Hun-
garian	 citizenship	 act,	 partly	 because	 the	 country	 had	 adopted	
similar	solutions	with	regard	to	citizens	of	Moldova	and	Ukraine.	
However,	 the	 opposition	 criticised	 the	 presidential	 camp	 for	
concessions	 towards	 Hungary.	 This	 led	 to	 tension	 between	 the	
two	 countries	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 political	 crisis	 in	 Romania	 in	
2012.	Romania	started	responding	with	 increasing	resistance	to	
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Budapest’s	 support	 for	 the	Hungarian	minority’s	aspirations	 for	
autonomy.	 It	 also	disliked	 the	 fact	 that	politicians	 from	Hunga-
ry,	especially	those	from	the	openly	revisionist	Jobbik	party,	had	
been	actively	seeking	the	support	of	voters	in	Romania’s	Transyl-
vania.	Despite	temporary	tension	 linked	to	the	dispute	over	the	
restitution	of	property	lost	after	the	war	by	Hungarians	from	Vo-
jvodina	(around	250,000),	relations	between	Hungary	and	Serbia	
have	been	good,	and	Hungary	has	taken	Serbia	as	a	model	for	pro-
tecting	the	rights	of	national	minorities.	
The	 rights	 of	 Hungarian	 minorities	 became	 the	 main	 issue	 in	
Hungary’s	 relations	with	Ukraine	 (around	 150,000	 ethnic	Hun-
garians	 live	 in	 Zakarpattia	 Oblast).	 Since	 the	 commencement	
of	the	protests	on	the	Maidan	in	November	2013,	reactions	from	
Hungary	 were	 limited	 to	 official	 statements	 condemning	 vio-
lence.	 Hungary	 supported	 Kyiv’s	 European	 aspirations,	 but	 its	
politicians	demonstrated	hardly	any	 interest	 in	 the	situation	 in	
Ukraine,	their	largest	neighbour.	The	government	in	Budapest	ap-
preciated	the	concessions	Yanukovych	had	made	to	national	mi-
norities	(including	the	regional	language	act	adopted)	and	feared	
the	possible	takeover	of	power	by	nationalist	movements.	A	more	
decided	tone	could	be	heard	following	the	Russian	intervention	in	
Crimea,	which	was	condemned	by	the	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	
Janos	Martonyi,	who	stood	up	for	sovereignty	of	Ukraine	and	the	
inviolability	of	its	borders.	Prime	Minister	Orban,	however,	em-
phasised	Hungary’s	neutrality,	stating	that	the	security	of	Zakar-
pattian	Hungarians	was	 the	most	 important	 issue.	 Concern	 for	
the	national	minority	also	provided	a	good	excuse	for	Hungary’s	
neutral	stance	on	the	conflict	and	allowed	it	to	reject	the	accusa-
tion	levelled	by	the	left-wing	opposition	that	the	government	was	
being	submissive	to	Russia.	
4. The Eastern opening
The	 Orban	 government	 granted	 high	 political	 significance	 to	
the	 ‘Eastern	 opening’	 strategy.	 Given	 the	 economic	 crisis	 which	
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Hungary’s	 traditional	Western	 partners	were	 experiencing,	 this	
strategy	assumed	establishing	closer	co-operation	with	the	emerg-
ing	economic	powers,	especially	China,	Azerbaijan,	Saudi	Arabia	
and	over	time	also	Russia.	In	addition	to	boosting	trade,	which	had	
already	been	growing	under	the	Socialist	government,	the	‘Eastern	
opening’	was	intended	to	attract	investments	and	gain	new	sources	
for	the	financing	of	the	Hungarian	debt.	Building	bonds	with	East-
ern	partners	was	accompanied	by	assurances	of	an	inescapable	de-
composition	of	the	EU	and	Western	civilisation,	and	the	opportuni-
ties	the	‘Eastern	wind’	were	offering	Hungary.	
The	 intensification	 of	 diplomatic	 relations	 failed	 to	 bring	 the	
promised	quick	effects,	although	this	could	have	a	positive	effect	
on	the	diversification	of	Hungary’s	economic	relations	in	the	long-
er	term.	China	and	the	Arab	states	were	not	interested	in	buying	
Hungary’s	high-risk	bonds.	No	spectacular	influx	of	investments	
from	the	East	was	seen,	either.	Although	a	number	of	 letters	of	
intent	 have	 been	 signed,	 including	 one	 concerning	 China’s	 in-
vestments	in	railroads	in	Hungary,	their	implementation	is	yet	to	
progress	beyond	the	planning	stages.	Exports	to	non-EU	member	
states	have	been	gradually	increasing.	However,	European	mar-
kets	 are	 still	 the	 main	 export	 direction,	 with	 Hungary	 selling	
around	75%	of	its	exports	there.	The	‘Eastern	opening’	policy	and	
establishing	closer	relations	with	countries	governed	by	authori-
tarian	regimes	have	also	revealed	some	threats.	Soon	after	Orban’s	
visit	to	Baku	in	2012,	Hungary	deported	Azerbaijani	colonel,	Ram-
il	Safarov,	who	had	been	serving	a	 jail	 sentence	 in	Hungary	 for	
brutally	murdering	an	Armenian	officer	during	a	NATO	training	
course	in	Budapest	 in	2004.	Safarov	was	immediately	pardoned	
in	Azerbaijan.	This	gave	rise	to	Armenia	freezing	relations	with	
Hungary	 and	 criticism	 from	 the	 international	 community.	 The	
Orban	government	is	searching	for	an	ideological	foundation	for	
the	‘Eastern	opening’	policy	by	attempts	to	draw	upon	the	mythi-
cal	union	of	Hungarians	and	Huns	and	other	Turanian	peoples,	
a	theory	which	has	a	long	tradition	among	the	Hungarian	political	
right,	and	which	is	especially	popular	among	radical	circles.	
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Over	time,	Russia	became	the	leading	state	in	the	‘Eastern	open-
ing’	 policy.	 Although	 when	 it	 was	 in	 opposition	 Fidesz	 had	 se-
verely	criticised	the	left-wing	government	for	its	submissiveness	
to	Moscow,	especially	for	the	consent	to	participate	in	the	South	
Stream	gas	pipeline	project,	it	continued	its	predecessors’	policy	
after	 the	 election.	 Firm	 support	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 South	
Stream	was	upheld,	and	 the	Orban	government	was	 the	first	 to	
withdraw	its	support	for	the	rival	Nabucco	gas	pipeline	project.	
The	government	also	decided	to	entrust	Russia’s	state-controlled	
company	Rosatom	with	 implementing	Hungary’s	 largest	 invest-
ment	 since	 1989,	without	 holding	 a	 tender.	 In	 January	 2014,	 an	
agreement	 envisaging	 the	 construction	 of	 new	 reactors	 for	 the	
Paks	nuclear	power	plant	was	 signed	 in	Moscow,	and	a	 30-year	
loan	of	around	10	billion	euros	is	expected	to	be	granted	by	Rus-
sian	banks.	Energy	co-operation	has	been	accompanied	by	the	es-
tablishment	of	 closer	political,	 economic	 and	 cultural	 relations,	
and	Prime	Minister	Orban	has	expressed	the	opinion	that	the	EU	
and	NATO	should	enhance	co-operation	with	Russia.	Official	con-
tacts	at	various	levels	have	also	been	intense;	Prime	Minister	Or-
ban	himself	has	made	three	visits	to	Moscow22.	A	greater	part	of	
the	right-wing	electorate	have	put	their	faith	in	Orban	that	he	is	
able	to	take	due	care	of	Hungary’s	interests	in	relations	with	Rus-
sia,	 although	 he	 had	 demonstrated	 a	 sceptical	 attitude	 towards	
Russia	for	years,	and	the	memory	of	the	1956	uprising	suppressed	
by	Soviet	troops	had	been	an	essential	element	of	Fidesz’s	identity.	
The	 political	 rapprochement	with	 Russia	 is	 an	 effect	 of	 the	 de-
sire	to	find	a	comprehensive	solution	to	the	challenges	which	the	
Hungarian	energy	sector	has	been	facing,	and	of	the	wish	to	treat	
22	 Closer	 co-operation	with	 Russia	 has	 also	 extended	 to	 establishing	 closer	
contacts	 between	 the	 two	 countries’	 government	 parties.	 For	 example,	
Fidesz	politicians	have	taken	part	in	party	congresses	of	the	United	Russia.	
In	2013,	Viktor	Zubkov,	the	Chairman	of	Gazprom’s	Board	of	Directors	and	
former	prime	minister,	was	awarded	with	the	Order	of	Merit	of	the	Repub-
lic	of	Hungary	(incidentally,	Prime	Minister	Gyurcsany	awarded	a	similar	
order	in	2005	to	the	president	of	Gazprom,	Alexey	Miller).	
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Russia	as	a	major	and	a	 reliable	partner.	Russian	gas	prices	are	
among	the	most	important	political	topics	for	the	government	in	
Budapest,	given	the	great	impact	of	natural	gas	on	the	Hungarian	
economy23.	Hungary	is	also	facing	the	challenge	of	developing	its	
only	nuclear	power	plant,	since	 the	deadline	 for	decommission-
ing	the	four	reactors	currently	in	operation	will	expire	between	
2032	and	2037.	Furthermore,	closer	co-operation	with	Russia	fits	
in	with	the	process	of	building	strong	players	on	the	domestic	en-
ergy	scene.	The	role	of	the	state-owned	corporation	MVM	has	sig-
nificantly	increased	under	Orban’s	rule,	and	this	may	contribute	
to	Hungary’s	negotiating	position	being	strengthened	in	its	deal-
ings	with	Russia.	MVM	has	been	put	in	charge	of	all	issues	to	be	
negotiated	with	Moscow	(the	development	of	 the	nuclear	power	
plant,	the	gas	contract	and	the	construction	of	South	Stream).	Ne-
gotiations	on	the	new	contract	for	the	supply	of	gas	are	set	to	be-
gin	soon	(the	present	one	expires	at	the	end	of	2015).
23	 At	the	same	time,	the	government	led	by	Orban	has	continued	the	previous	
cabinet’s	efforts	to	diversify	gas	supplies	 in	order	to	temper	the	country’s	
dependence	on	Russian	gas	(e.g.	the	construction	of	interconnectors).	
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CONCLUSION AND FORECASTS
Despite	multiple	constitutional	and	economic	changes,	harsh	crit-
icism	at	home	and	abroad,	 and	 the	difficult	 economic	 situation,	
Fidesz	as	the	government	party	has	been	able	to	retain	a	signifi-
cant	part	of	its	electorate	and	has	led	in	all	the	polls	throughout	
its	entire	term.	The	party’s	popularity	has	not	been	adversely	af-
fected	by	the	fact	that	it	has	been	using	the	law	as	it	deems	fit	or	
because	of	the	plagiarism	scandal	which	culminated	in	the	resig-
nation	of	the	president	who	had	been	nominated	by	Fidesz.	Inter-
national	criticism	and	the	government’s	disputes	with	EU	insti-
tutions,	the	Council	of	Europe	and	the	USA	have	had	hardly	any	
impact	on	Fidesz’s	domestic	support	levels.	
One	 of	 the	 reasons	why	 the	 support	 for	Orban’s	 party	 has	 not	
fallen	is	the	fact	that	the	reforms	have	not	seriously	harmed	the	
interests	of	any	social	group.	Those	better-off,	who	form	an	es-
sential	part	of	Fidesz’s	electorate,	have	benefited	from	the	flat-
rate	tax.	At	the	same	time,	the	government	has	raised	the	mini-
mum	wage,	which	has	been	an	 important	gesture	 for	 those	on	
lower	incomes.	Despite	the	dire	straits	faced	by	public	finances,	
pension	 indexations	were	 carried	 out	 every	 year.	 This	 has	 al-
lowed	Fidesz	 to	maintain	 the	support	of	pensioners,	who	 form	
a	group	of	around	two	million.	The	energy	price	cuts	for	individ-
ual	clients	made	in	the	last	year	of	the	government’s	term	have	
distracted	the	attention	from	tax	rises	and	economic	stagnation.	
This	 move	 has	 positively	 affected	 all	 consumers.	 The	 govern-
ment	has	thus	been	able	to	avoid	public	unrest.	Demonstrations	
have	been	held	only	 in	the	capital	and	concerned	 issues	which	
have	no	direct	impact	on	citizens’	everyday	life,	such	as	the	pro-
tection	of	the	freedom	of	speech,	the	rule	of	law	and	the	separa-
tion	of	power.	
Additional	fiscal	burdens	have	been	imposed	on	large	companies	
from	the	economic	sectors	where	foreign	capital	predominates.	
This	has	provoked	negative	reactions	abroad	and	may	adversely	
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affect	the	investment	climate	and	Hungary’s	international	posi-
tion	in	the	longer	term.	However,	Fidesz	has	been	able	to	capi-
talise	on	tension	in	relations	with	its	foreign	partners	and	thus	
consolidate	 its	 electorate	 using	 slogans	 about	 defending	 the	
country’s	 sovereignty.	 It	 has	 also	 been	 able	 to	 maintain	 high	
support	 levels	through	a	constant	mobilisation	of	its	electorate	
manifested	for	example	by	marches	of	support	 for	 the	govern-
ment	 (so-called	 “peace	marches”),	 signature	 collecting	 actions	
to	 support	Fidesz’s	projects,	 letters	 sent	by	 the	prime	minister	
to	 citizens	 and	 the	 government’s	 advertising	 campaigns.	 The	
continuing	popularity	of	Prime	Minister	Orban	himself	has	also	
been	an	important	factor.	
Fidesz	also	owes	its	strong	position	to	the	weakness	of	the	oppo-
sition.	The	political	left	has	been	unable	to	successfully	dissoci-
ate	itself	from	the	negatively	evaluated	rule	in	2002-2010	and	to	
offer	a	more	appealing	alternative	 to	Orban’s	 rule.	New	 initia-
tives,	 such	as	 technocrat	Gordon	Bajnai	entering	politics,	have	
only	attracted	a	small	section	of	 the	centrist	electorate	disillu-
sioned	with	Fidesz’s	rule.	In	January	2014,	the	key	left-wing	and	
liberal	parties	decided	to	draw	up	a	common	election	list	and	to	
put	 forward	 joint	 candidates	 in	 single-member	 constituencies,	
to	 thus	 increase	 their	 chances	 for	 success.	However,	 the	pres-
ence	 of	 discredited	politicians,	 such	 as	 former	prime	minister	
Ferenc	Gyurcsany,	is	a	serious	burden	for	this	alliance.	The	radi-
cal	right	Jobbik	party,	which	is	currently	the	third	strongest	po-
litical	force	in	parliament,	has	maintained	its	previous	level	of	
support.	Since	Fidesz	has	implemented	part	of	the	radical	right’s	
proposals	 and	 has	 strongly	 emphasised	 national	 and	 historic	
issues,	 Jobbik’s	 chances	 of	 improving	 the	 result	 achieved	 four	
years	ago	are	now	lower.	
If	Fidesz	wins	the	parliamentary	election,	as	expected,	it	will	most	
probably	focus	on	strengthening	the	state’s	role	in	the	economy	in	
the	coming	years.	The	most	controversial	political	changes	have	
already	 been	made	 in	 the	 present	 term,	 so	 Hungary’s	 disputes	
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with	its	Western	partners	are	likely	to	be	mitigated,	though	inci-
dental	tension	may	appear.	However,	if	relations	with	partners	in	
the	EU	and	NATO	deteriorate,	it	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	Hungary	
will	make	more	active	attempts	to	search	for	allies	in	the	East.	
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